

AD-A234 166

2

**Awaiting an Enemy:
The Operational Significance of
Politically Induced Force Reductions to Parity
in Central Europe**

**A Monograph
by
Lieutenant Colonel James L. Moody
Air Defense**



ESTIC
APR 24 1991

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Second Term, AY 89/90

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

91 4 23 166

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for Public Release; Distribution UN Limited		
DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ATZL-SWV	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900			9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
			WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.		
1. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Awaiting An Enemy: The Operational Significance of Politically Induced Force Reductions to Parity in Central Europe (U)					
2. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LTC James L. Moody					
3a. TYPE OF REPORT Monograph		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 90/05/10	
				15. PAGE COUNT 56	
6. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
7. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	NATO Background CFE Background/Trends		
			Maneuver/Attrition		
			France, 1940		
9. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) See attached copy					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL LTC James L. Moody			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (913) 684-3437		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL ATZL-SWV

ABSTRACT

AWAITING AN ENEMY: THE OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICALLY
INDUCED FORCE REDUCTIONS TO PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE by LTC
James L. Moody, USA.

History is replete with evidence of how change in political, economic, and social conditions forge alterations in a nation's military posture. Today, the forces of change are rampant, especially in NATO's Central European theater. Recent Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms reduction proposals have rekindled disarmament debate and have caused the military leadership to reassess Alliance defense initiatives in view of vague and changing conditions.

This monograph examines how the CFE negotiations will impact on future military operations. The study's primary focus will analyze how post-CFE treaty limitations (e.g. geographic dispersion and parity between NATO and WP forces) will tend to influence two broad operational concepts of warfare--war by maneuver or by attrition. Naturally, both concepts are important, interrelated, and situationally dependent; however, a shifting emphasis may be warranted to properly align military operations with the ends of national policy.

The study is based on the Clausewitzian theory which suggests that the political realm will dominate over the military during periods of decreased tension. This theory was evident in 1940 as the French allowed political expediency to foster a "Maginot Line" mentality with little regard for the changing conditions of warfare. The outcome of the war was not that maneuver simply won at the expense of the French who had developed a fascination for attrition warfare. It was that French political and military leaders became "blinded" by what seemed acceptable rather than by what was needed for security.

Today, maneuver "blindness" may be forsaking the need to take greater advantage of attrition warfare (e.g. advanced weaponry, fortifications, barriers) in Central Europe. The NATO Alliance increasingly looks to maneuver as the solution for shrinking force-to-space ratios in the forward defensive area. This inclination toward maneuver appears to increase despite mounting political pressures to severely limit military operations.


The conclusions call for a balanced political-military approach which continues to resource a significant maneuver capability. Correspondingly, the importance of attrition warfare should be expanded to protect vital areas to the defense of the West. In short, parity allows NATO to make better use of the spectrum of defense which will widen as the WP scales-down to the mandated CFE force levels. The end result will be to enhance deterrence while increasing the overall strength of the defense--the ultimate aim of the Alliance Charter.

School of Advanced Military Studies
Monograph Approval


Name of Student: James L. Moody, Lieutenant Colonel, Air
Defense

Title of Monograph: Awaiting An Enemy -- The Operational
Significance of Politically Induced
Force Reductions to Parity in Central
Europe

Approved by:




Lieutenant Colonel David F. Young, M.A. Monograph Director



Colonel William H. Janes, M.A. Director, School of
Military Advanced

Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate
Degree Program

Accepted this 7th day of June 1990.

Approved

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

WHS

A-1

ABSTRACT

AWAITING AN ENEMY: THE OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICALLY
INDUCED FORCE REDUCTIONS TO PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE by LTC
James L. Moody, USA.

History is replete with evidence of how change in political, economic, and social conditions forge alterations in a nation's military posture. Today, the forces of change are rampant, especially in NATO's Central European theater. Recent Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms reduction proposals have rekindled disarmament debate and have caused the military leadership to reassess Alliance defense initiatives in view of vague and changing conditions.

This monograph examines how the CFE negotiations will impact on future military operations. The study's primary focus will analyze how post-CFE treaty limitations (e.g. geographic dispersion and parity between NATO and WP forces) will tend to influence two broad operational concepts of warfare--war by maneuver or by attrition. Naturally, both concepts are important, interrelated, and situationally dependent; however, a shifting emphasis may be warranted to properly align military operations with the ends of national policy.

The study is based on the Clausewitzian theory which suggests that the political realm will dominate over the military during periods of decreased tension. This theory was evident in 1940 as the French allowed political expediency to foster a "Maginot Line" mentality with little regard for the changing conditions of warfare. The outcome of the war was not that maneuver simply won at the expense of the French who had developed a fascination for attrition warfare. It was that French political and military leaders became "blinded" by what seemed acceptable rather than by what was needed for security.

Today, maneuver "blindens" may be forsaking the need to take greater advantage of attrition warfare (e.g. advanced weaponry, fortifications, barriers) in Central Europe. The NATO Alliance increasingly looks to maneuver as the solution for shrinking force-to-space ratios in the forward defensive area. This inclination toward maneuver appears to increase despite mounting political pressures to severely limit military operations.

The conclusions call for a balanced political-military approach which continues to resource a significant maneuver capability. Correspondingly, the importance of attrition warfare should be expanded to protect vital areas to the defense of the West. In short, parity allows NATO to make better use of the spectrum of defense which will widen as the WP scales-down to the mandated CFE force levels. The end result will be to enhance deterrence while increasing the overall strength of the defense--the ultimate aim of the Alliance Charter.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section I.	
Introduction.1
Section II.	
Rooted in Theory5
Section III.	
NATO's Formative Years	10
Section IV.	
Winning Quickly	16
Section V.	
Pathway to Parity	23
Section VI.	
Parity and Choice	27
Section VII.	
Conclusions	39
Illustrations	
Figure 1, Pre-CFE Operational Trends	32
Figure 2, Post-CFE Operational Trends	34
Endnotes	45
Bibliography	54

War to the hilt, between Communism and Capitalism, is inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in twenty or thirty years. To win, we shall need the element of surprise. The bourgeois will have to be put to sleep. So, we begin by launching the most spectacular PEACE MOVEMENT on record. There will be electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to cooperate in their own destruction. They will leap at another chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall smash them with our clenched fists!

DIMITRI Z. MANUILSKY
Deputy to the Comintern at the
Lenin School of Political Warfare,
Moscow, 1930

I. INTRODUCTION

Europe is undergoing an incredible year of change. Many people credit the sophisticated statesman, Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, for the dramatic changes. He recognized that Soviet superpower status was precariously balanced on the single leg of military power.¹

While the Soviet military might was growing, Soviet communism had declined significantly as a political-economic and social model for the world: Soviet political and economic influence was spotty at best, and Soviet technological power was falling further behind world standards.² From Gorbachev's perspective, rebuilding the political, economic, and social bases underlying Soviet superpower status were intimately tied to economic reform that, in turn, had important implications for defense.³

The Gorbachev reforms have ushered in a wave of political freedoms markedly different from those of previous regimes. Since his rise to power in 1983, every Warsaw Pact (WP) country has changed its leadership; the Soviet Union has initialized free, open debate and elections into their parliament; and the dissident, Andrei Sakharov, exiled to Gorky in 1980 has gained a seat in the government.⁴ The communist bastion in Eastern Europe began to crumble at a blistering pace.

East Germany was the first domino to fall in the cascading torrent of new-found freedoms. Liberation brought down the Berlin Wall. The East Germans rose up, deserted their discredited leaders and headed west by the millions. Shouting "we are the people," the masses swept away the East German Communist Party that had stood under Erich Honecker for 18 years.⁵

Hungary likewise moved toward democracy. The Communist Party was displaced and the red stars were removed from their buildings. Lenin's statue was dismantled near Budapest's Heroes Square. Multi-party elections were instituted. Similar scenes were repeated in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. "The seismic shift jolted the order created by Josef Stalin and his Red Army after World War II and opened up the prospect of a new future for Europe."⁶

The precipitator of change has been the floundering economic status of the communist Warsaw Pact (WP) nations. Secretary Gorbachev has recognized the perilous circumstance, seized the initiative, and taken aggressive remedial action to quell public discontent. Planned reductions in military expenditures and a revision of Soviet security doctrine are pivotal to his program to rejuvenate the economy.⁷ The West watches the kaleidoscope of events in the Soviet Union swirling almost out of control. Where will it all end? Will the prospect for peace be enhanced or will the instability inherent in change contribute to conflict?

The "winds of peace" that leveled the Berlin Wall are now blowing toward the NATO Alliance. Even before the Wall came down, 39 per cent of the West German people surveyed thought that a war in Central Europe was unlikely.⁸ The public perceptions of a reduced WP threat have fueled a NATO security dilemma between advocates for a continued strong defensive posture and the growing sentiment for reduced defense spending. Increasingly, NATO's calls for caution, parity, and modernization are falling on the deaf ears of a frustrated and impatient public, and many are the parties and politicians who see votes in opposing the cost and inconvenience of defense.⁹

Solving the dilemma will depend on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms reduction treaty currently being negotiated in Vienna, Austria. The political objective will be to achieve a NATO and WP agreement on a stable, durable, and verifiable balance in conventional forces at much lower levels than at present.¹⁰ The military, on the other hand, will be challenged to contribute to the process and adjust the military strategy and operations to support the political aims of the Alliance.

This study examines the question: What will be the operational significance of a politically induced force reduction to parity with the Warsaw Pact (WP)? Imbedded in this question is a requirement to assess how force parity in Central Europe affects (1) deterrence, (2) the WP's ability to concentrate forces, and (3) NATO's capability to estab-

lish end states which promote early political conditions favorable to the Alliance.

The scope of the study is limited in three areas. The first is to address only the ground force conventional portion of the Flexible Response strategy. A second is the inherent assumption that NATO and the WP have agreed to force levels of near-equal size and capability (generally defined as parity in this monograph). The final limit involves analyzing only two broad-based theoretical concepts that may tend to dominate defensive thinking in the post-parity period (i.e. attrition and maneuver-oriented warfare).

This study is not intended to be a detailed course of action analysis. Instead, history, theory, and current events are examined to assess future NATO defense needs. The current environment of increasing political influence coupled with perceptions of a diminishing Soviet threat to the Central Region warrant careful attention in the wake of changing ends-means relationships.

This paper is organized into seven sections. After this introduction, Section 2 applies theory to current European political conditions and examines the attack or defend dilemma as posed by Clausewitz. Section 3 is a synopsis of NATO history and the strategy of Flexible Response. Section 4 looks at pre-1940 France to determine how conditions shaped political decisions and military affairs. The section highlights German blitzkrieg warfare against France

and then points out the compelling reasons why the Soviet's must avoid a protracted war (i.e. the conduct of blitzkrieg-type operations). Section 5 focuses on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms reduction proposals and changing Soviet threat considerations. Section 6 analyzes how the move to a politically induced parity agreement may affect NATO's future defensive operations. Section 7 presents the study's conclusions.

II. ROOTED IN THEORY

Theory is the glimmer of light in the darkened room. Its purpose is to illuminate the normal.¹¹ The more vague the circumstances, the more relevant theory becomes, especially when compared to past events. Decision-makers find theories particularly useful in analyzing complex military strategies and operational concepts.

Military theory has increased relevance in Europe today. The continent has suddenly become a convoluted, hectic environment. Political and military leaders are left wanting for solutions to the chaotic situation threatening alliance cohesion and the continuing peace prospects for NATO's Central Region. They face many significant problems not the least of which is the political frenzy surrounding the arms control negotiations which have outpaced the assessment of national strategic interests.

While the failure to properly link political and military strategies can have severe destabilizing effects, an integrated approach will clarify the military's role in supporting alliance objectives. A well-developed, comprehensive alliance strategy is necessary for two fundamental reasons. The first is to achieve the desired political aims at the lowest possible cost in lives and treasure. The second is to provide the framework for a viable military strategy.¹²

The crucial linkage between the use of military force and the attainment of political objectives was aptly addressed by Sir B.H. Liddell Hart in his book, Strategy, published in 1967. He defined military strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."¹³ He continues to describe strategy as involving choices within the framework of finite resources, and an ability to distinguish between the desirable and the possible, the essential and the expendable. A sound sense of priorities is the essence of a sound strategy.¹⁴

In Liddell Hart's definition of military strategy, it becomes apparent that he is describing more than a mechanical or scientific process. He is also emphasizing the importance of the "artist" who must orchestrate the development and implementation of the military strategy--the operational commander. This person is pivotal in deciding when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle. He practices operational art which is defined as "the em-

ployment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns or major operations."¹⁵ He must have an astute understanding of the relationship between means and ends.

The operational artist in NATO has the responsibility to link alliance security objectives with tactical operations. His challenge requires the continual reappraisal of three groups of variables identified by Clausewitz as, the people, the military, and the government--the "paradoxical trinity".¹⁶

Clausewitz wrote about war. His writings are classics with a relevant perspective still valid in the modern era. Take for instance, his timeless metaphor which captures the interrelationship of the trinity--"The people stoke the passionate engine of hate, the government lays down the track of national interest, but the commander must decide how to drive the train of war."¹⁷ Clearly, Clausewitz understood the role of the commander in tailoring the available military means to suit the ends of national interest.

Though Clausewitz was a philosopher of war and not a political theorist, he had a vivid appreciation for where the military fit into the political apparatus. This is evident in his familiar premise: "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means."¹⁸ He further described policy as being the master over military action and

suggested that the army (i.e. the military means) should conflict as little as possible with the political objective in the ideal situation.

A popular war with inspired motives typifies a case where the military aims and the political objectives coincide. This situation will appear to be more military in its orientation. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political objectives. The war is driven further from its natural course. Political objectives increasingly deviate from the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem progressively more political in character.¹⁹

While Clausewitz clearly recognized the political dimension of war, he appears to have had a narrow focus on the role of deterring or moderating warfare. He described the moderation of war as illogical. He viewed social conditions between civilized nations to be a pre-war phenomenon that was not a factor in the waging war.²⁰

Unlike Sun Tzu who thought that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill", Clausewitz ridiculed the idea of winning without fighting:

It would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between kind-hearted, civilized peoples resulting from a rational and dispassionate act on the part of government...so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces--comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra.²¹

Today, warfighting can no longer be limited to a clash of armies. It sprawls across industry, economic sectors, and entire populations.²² The powerful social factors and the unthinkable lethality of emerging technologies tend to make "war by algebra" probable. In short, the devastating consequences of modern warfare supports both deterrence in peacetime and moderation in war.

The current arms reduction process seeks to weaken the ability of nations to conduct significant offensive operations. By neutering military forces of their attack potential, the defense--or the stronger form of war--tends to become dominant. Clausewitz viewed the defense as a means of "preserving" one's strength when conditions were not suitable for "conquest" through offensive action.

The talks in Vienna exemplify how political negotiations are setting conditions which dispel attack options thereby generating an equality of weakness between adversaries. This climate will theoretically nurture deterrence. Clausewitz warned, however, that changing conditions which favor an attack would forever tempt a revival of an offensive spirit.²³

The future NATO defense posture rests on the shifting sands of change, chance, and uncertainty. Theorists have routinely cautioned against the tendency to wallow in the "tried and true." The bondage of the familiar and the previously successful can stagnate the mind, and perhaps, destroy an alliance. For conditions do change and innovative think-

ing must prevail to capture opportunities for maintaining an effective deterrent in Central Europe with fewer resources. Movement toward parity, it is suggested, will now provide the NATO defender with a wider choice of operational options than was heretofore the case. At the same time, parity will tend to weaken the WP's ability to seize victory through a series of swift, bold maneuvers by eliminating the Soviet's historically preponderant force ratios.

III. NATO'S FORMATIVE YEARS

The political environs of Central Europe have long been controversial due to the constant barrage of both hot and cold war rhetoric. Today's unprecedented changes have rekindled the entire spectrum of defense-related debate. One fundamental issue centers on the viability of NATO and its future role in European security. The look ahead, however, should include a retrospective assessment of the conditions which led to the formation of NATO and its Flexible Response strategy.

The bullying and sinister behavior of the Soviets under Stalin dampened Western attempts to enact the European Recovery Program in 1947. Poland and Czechoslovakia sought aid under the Marshall Plan to combat hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Stalin prevented the assistance--an action indicative of his "increasingly sullen, uncooperative attitude." ²⁴ More threatening, however, was the emergence

of the Soviet armed superiority. Such power was recklessly applied to seize control of Czechoslovakia and to blockade Berlin in 1948. Each act heightened fears that a Russian advance to occupy Western Europe was possible.²⁵

The security threat posed by the Soviets served to unify Western European nations. The British, and more momentously, the Americans, had embraced a "continental commitment" requiring the peacetime stationing of forces in Europe.²⁶ The signing of the Washington Treaty on April 4, 1949, became NATO's official Charter.²⁷

The Western Alliance pledged "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of the people; to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic; and to unite in a collective defense for the preservation of peace and security. Article 5 of the Charter established NATO's collective security provision--an attack on one member is an attack on us all."²⁸ The United States (US) was to become a pillar of strength within NATO and her interest in the Europe was to become increasingly evident.

President Truman used a September, 1950, radio message to announce a decision to increase the US forces in Europe. The President made two major demands. The first was that General Eisenhower be made the first Supreme Commander of the NATO Alliance. The second was to retain authority to withdraw American troops once Europe had acquired sufficient military

strength.²⁹ This political decision was clearly the signal of a US commitment to, and an interest in, the continuing affairs of Europe.

George Kennan has long supported a strong US interest in Europe. As an architect of the post-war US policy of containment, he argues that there were only five regions of industrial importance in the world: the Soviet Union, the Rhine Valley, Great Britain, Japan, and the US. In Kennan's view, the object of US security policy was to keep the four non-Soviet industrial centers from falling under Soviet domination. Since two of the key areas are in Western Europe, US national interests are said to be firmly linked to the region.³⁰

In an effort to bolster stability in Central Europe, the Alliance struggled over the years to keep its military strategy in concert with the political aim of deterring Soviet aggression. Effective deterrence evolved to include conventional forces balanced with a nuclear capability. This capability recognized the need to have a credible response to a crisis. The long-debated, hypothetical nuclear exchange between Washington and Moscow over a border incursion in Fulda was viewed as lacking credibility and failing deterrence. The general acceptance that a strong conventional response capability was a vital part of nuclear deterrence ushered in a new NATO strategy.³¹

In the 1950's, the US Army lobbied, with little success, in favor of more emphasis on non-strategic military power. The US Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, published a book in 1955 entitled, The Uncertain Trumpet, proposing a new strategy known as Flexible Response. The strategy called for conventional forces large enough to meet some forms of aggression without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. This concept raised the nuclear threshold and increased the probability that, if nuclear weapons were used, they would come in the later stage of the conflict.³²

The strategy of Flexible Response evolved into a three-tiered approach. The first is direct defense. This is to deny an aggressor his objectives through a range of responses, conventional and nuclear. The second is deliberate escalation. This constitutes a measured, politically controlled use of nuclear weapons if necessary. The final, and most powerful response, is a general nuclear attack against the aggressor's strategic potential. Flexible Response then ensures deterrence through a wide range of forces equipped with a well-balanced mixture of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear weapons.³³

The conventional cornerstone of the Flexible Response strategy is the fighting of a forward defense. This defensive arrangement, adopted by NATO in September, 1963, was tailored to the security policies of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).³⁴

Since the late 1940's, the NATO Alliance recognized the military necessity and the political desirability of a border defense. The geopolitical position of West Germany has dominated defense requirements. A scant 100 kilometer deep operational area is wedged between two politically restrictive barriers--the IGB (inner German border) and the beginning of the nation's heartland. Bonn officials have said, "This fact denies the Federal Republic of Germany any alternative to a forward defense."³⁵

In the 1950's and early 1960, the NATO strategy was altered several times by changing conditions. One NATO ground force strategy was based on the need to "fall back" from the border using delay operations against the communist hordes. Strategic bombing of the enemy's homeland, his extended lines of communications, and combat attrition would eventually destroy his will to continue the attack.³⁶

Another strategy used ground forces as a "trip wire." This approach relied primarily on a nuclear response. The trigger mechanism was to have been the small, relatively weak, conventional forces manning the border.³⁷ Though both strategies attempted to deter aggressive action, each potentially lost ground in an area already deficient in operational space.

In the mid 1970's, conventional forces were becoming more important in the deterrence equation. Strategies were driving doctrine to develop more effective ground force defenses. The German military was developing a "mobile

defense" concept while US planners fashioned the Active Defense doctrine. Both defense designs used a three-stage defense poised against a Soviet threat to Central Europe: 1) a covering force along the border, 2) a continuous, entrenched, heavily armed defensive line to prevent an enemy penetration, and 3) a counterattack to defeat the aggressor and reclaim any lost territory.

Throughout the 1980's, US AirLand Battle doctrinal development arguably influenced NATO strategic thoughts and operations. The importance of seizing offensive opportunities while defending prompted some member nations to reassess their war plans and to develop new concepts for fighting a large, echeloned force. In 1984, for example, a concept to use deep operational fires to interdict Soviet follow-on force echelons innovatively added depth in a theater lacking operational depth.³⁸

The future evolution of strategy and doctrine will continue as change sweeps across the Central European theater. Today's economic, social, and political changes will undoubtedly lead to a fundamental restructuring of the European security system.³⁹ Conventional arms control--the so-called CFE talks--represent one mechanism for managing change while enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war.⁴⁰

The negotiations attempt to prescribe force structure limitations (i.e. equipment and manpower) that balance NATO and WP forces below existing strength in designated geographical areas. This approach ideally sets the conditions for a peaceful stalemate between the once adversarial alliances.

Realistically, however, NATO must "worst case" parity at reduced force levels with an assumption that deterrence may fail in the future. Though a return to a more hostile Soviet foreign policy seems unlikely in the near-term, one cannot say it is impossible. Take for instance James Billington's (Librarian of the US Congress) comment before the Armed Services Committee:

There is no more insecure time in the life of an empire than when it is facing the devolution of its power; no more dangerous time in the life of a religion (communism being, after all, a secular religion) than when it has lost its inner faith but retains its outer power.⁴¹

Interestingly, the defending French in 1940 appeared on the surface to rival the military power of Nazi Germany until Hitler's blitzkrieg exposed the internal weakness of a once dominant military force. The next section will examine this campaign due to its similarities with the modern European environment.

IV. WINNING QUICKLY

Near perfect conditions existed in 1940 to allow the German blitzkrieg to devastate the French in a dash from the Siegfried Line to the English Channel. The stage was set for

a one-sided war between two near equal, at least on paper, military forces. The path shaping French military strategy in 1940 represents a benchmark for looking at tomorrow's NATO defense. A glimpse of the war on the Western Front demonstrates strengths and weaknesses which had developed from prewar conditions.

Germany launched a sudden, surprise attack on the West on May 10, 1940. Aerial bombardment and paratroopers first rained down on Holland and Belgium. Ground forces followed quickly to overrun weak and retreating resistance. The rout was underway. Further south, the Belgians lost a key fortress, Fort Eben Emael.⁴² The entire front was folding rapidly.

The French enriched German opportunities. Feeling no real threat in the south, General Maurice Gamelin, Allied Commander in Chief, focused his attention on the activities in the north. Meanwhile, the "impregnable" Ardennes Forest was teeming with Panzer divisions ready to explode from hiding to rupture the enemy defense and race across France. Ineffective intelligence, poor communications, and dismal air-ground coordination were but a scant number of the withering deficiencies daunting the French leadership.

On May 13, the blitzkrieg exploded from the Ardennes and into documented history. The broken French defense and the German's successful offensive exploitations left historians searching for conditions leading one nation to a spectacular victory and handing another a disgraceful defeat.

French wartime operations are generally traced to pre-war conditions molding eventual battlefield failures. France lost its fighting spirit--that intangible credited with bringing them victory from the chaos of World War I. The once fearsome fighting unit decayed under inept military and governmental leadership.⁴³ The nation grew listless and complacent behind the "shield of France", the Maginot Line. This technologically sophisticated barrier breathed a false confidence into the French government and its citizenry.⁴⁴

Confidence in the Line had a price. The fortification was to protect France's vulnerable southeast border freeing troops to block German approaches advancing through Belgium.⁴⁵

The ambitious Maginot Line financially wrecked the already depressed French economy. The wall exhausted the country's funds, its initiative and simultaneously fueled the illusion of security. Over \$200 million went into the project at the expense of the French Air Force and Army modernization requirements.

Rapidly, the Maginot Line came to be not just a component of strategy but a way of life. Feeling secure behind it . . . the French Army allowed itself to atrophy . . . complacency, lassitude, deficiencies of manpower and finance conspired to rust the superb weapon which the world had so admired. . . .⁴⁶

The political dynamics between the wars nourished a period of "appeasement." The French Foreign Affairs Minister, Aristide Briand, who proclaimed he knew the mood of the people, talked extensively of disarmament, faith in the League of Nations, and of his self-appointed role as the "pilgrim of

peace."⁴⁷ Increasingly, peace initiatives dominated a society simply longing to be left alone. The horrors and wastefulness of World War I were increasingly and universally decried in volumes of anti-war literature.⁴⁸

Hitler played on the French fears and hopes. He manipulated France with peace propaganda and pledges to renounce any claim to Alsace-Lorraine. The barrage worked and Frenchmen slept well behind their Maginot Line.⁴⁹ The attitude of growing numbers of French was one of "escapism into a Golden Age"--peace seems finally assured; the expansion of the German Nazi party was a mere fringe phenomenon, without any serious significance....⁵⁰

The French hypnosis began to wear off in the mid-to-late 1930's. The threat posed by Hitler-ruled Germany seemed more real. Defense budgets began to steadily climb. In 1937, the government decided to construct light pillboxes along the unguarded northern frontier. The act was wholeheartedly accepted by the French as a prolongation of the Maginot Line.

Programs designed to improve mechanization, however, lacked support. The High Command harbored hostility toward a need to rearm and manufacturers did not want to push workers beyond a 40-hour work week.⁵¹ The nation in general was disinclined to believe that any combination of tanks and aircraft could alter the balance of warfare. "For the Army," remarked one disillusioned Frenchman, "perhaps a victory is harder to overcome than defeat."⁵²

A political maverick, Paul Raynaud, staunchly advocated a mobile, offensive Army to deter German aggression. His ally was Army Major Charles de Gaulle. For such audacious thought, de Gaulle was stricken from the 1936 promotion list. 53

In short, the French military was woefully unprepared to fight the next war. The cause was the pacifism of the politicians and the public. Military doctrine was not understood, not particularly important, and not revised to accommodate the change of conditions. 54

Belatedly, France made a final, desperate attempt to adapt to the kind of warfare inaugurated by Germany in the Polish campaign. Attempts were made to form division-sized armored formations to stop the blitz tactics. However, six months proved too short a time to create an effective mobile force.

The war was lost years before it was fought. Throughout the campaign, the Germans had repeatedly demonstrated, despite strategic parity, they could achieve operational preponderance through maneuver at decisive points. It was lost in "the sliminess of disastrous incompetence" that passed for leadership in France.⁵⁵ "Never before in modern history had France been so prostrate, so stunned and broken in spirit. Defeat the French had known. This was far more than defeat; it was utter humiliation, almost too deep for any Frenchman to comprehend."⁵⁶

While the German blitzkrieg through France in 1940 was spectacular, the deeply rooted desire for the short war is even more pronounced in Soviet military history. Soviet offensive operations are characteristically aggressive, mobile, and fast-paced. Achieving the "quick victory" has become a virtual obsession.

P. H. Vigor, author of Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory, examines previous Soviet campaigns which exemplify the Soviet's penchant for using surprise, speed, and shock action to overwhelm their opponent. He concludes that Soviet doctrine will increasingly espouse the need to win quickly as a paramount condition for attacking NATO's forward defense.⁵⁷

The Soviets view a short war with NATO as an "ends" unto itself. Such rationale includes factors reflective of past campaigns and future realities. Perhaps the most important reason for needing a short war is pure economics. The Soviet's recognize their inferior economic position relative to the West. They view quick victory as essential for sustaining their own operations while hampering the enemy's potential for mobilizing his superior industrial capability.⁵⁸

Winning quickly has also had a powerful motivational quality of its own. History is replete with instances where short wars to defend a nation's homeland sparked a ferocious fighting spirit. The Soviets proved to be bold, tenacious, and willing to make any sacrifice in preserving the Motherland against Hitler's invading Nazi forces in the Second World

War. Conversely, the prolonged war in Afghanistan which lacked popular support proved to be despiriting and ultimately doomed Soviet operations.⁵⁹

Traditionally, the East and West have generally disagreed on the ability to achieve an early victory. The West believes that no modern war has been won in the initial period. The Soviets, however, take a contrary view citing the 1945 Soviet-Japanese war in Manchuria as a case in point. The Soviet affinity for the quick victory highlights such advantages: (1) operations typically go as planned; (2) casualty rates are reduced; (3) the reliance on reserve officers and inferior, inexperienced conscripts is lowered; and, of course, (4) the strain on the domestic economy is eased.⁶⁰

As the new decade of the 1990s unfolds, a quick victory by the WP over NATO is increasingly unlikely. The quest for liberty by the Eastern European countries hardly supports the feasibility of a unified WP attack against NATO. Furthermore, the Soviet Communist Party leadership has assured their people for more than forty years that an attack on NATO would be immoral and unjust.⁶¹ A departure from this ideology would tend to erode public support for the government while damaging the morale of its armed forces.

The next decade will also usher in the fruits of an expected arms control treaty between NATO and the WP. The CFE treaty promises significant equipment and personnel reductions designed to better balance the conventional forces of the two alliances.

V. PATHWAY TO PARITY

General Bernard Rogers, NATO's former top military officer, shocked many by indicating that he would be forced to "go nuclear" within seven days of a WP attack against the Alliance. His replacement, General John Galvin, said perhaps fourteen days.⁶² The cause of the "hair triggered" nuclear response was largely attributable to the WP's huge quantitative advantage in conventional forces. The arms reduction talks titled, Convention Forces in Europe (CFE), have the potential to rectify the destabilizing imbalance between the alliances.

The threat to Central Europe lies at the heart of future defense matters. The Soviet Union orients against Western Europe with the world's most powerful military force. Until recently, the menacing Reds steadily built upon already superior conventional advantages over NATO forces. This imbalance was further exacerbated by their impressive qualitative improvements and force modernization programs.

The competitive arms race may have ended on December 7, 1988. Secretary General Gorbachev announced his intention to unilaterally reduce conventional forces. The Soviets would reduce their force structure by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft over the next two years.⁶³

The Soviet proclamation has become increasingly credible in the context of subsequent acts. Suddenly, the Soviet security policy appears to be refocused with emphasis on what is being termed "reasonable sufficiency." This concept implies achieving parity by only matching Western military efforts.

Reasonable sufficiency from the Soviet view has three dimensions: political, military-technical, and economic. The political aspects concentrate on arms control to further security interest. The military side seeks to rebuff an attacker with no unreasonable surplus of military potential. The final dimension recognizes the economic aspect. The Soviets now openly discuss the law of diminishing returns relevant to the arms race. Their economy is testament to failures in balancing the cost and benefits of maintaining a large standing military force.⁶⁴

Soviet military strategy also appears to be changing. Though self-described as a "defensive" Pact, the Red Army has always been decidedly offensive in nature. Soviet military writers now devote considerable attention to the "defensive defense" concept--"a force posture and a military strategy based on offensive self-denial."⁶⁵

Despite talk of defense, the Western TVD aligned against Central Europe retains a significant offensive capability. The CFE treaty does not limit Soviet forces east of the Ural Mountains. These forces represent the greatest risk to Central European security and would be the nucleus of a mid-to-high intensity attack against the NATO Central Region given a

post-CFE scenario. Indications suggest that the Soviet's future doctrine of offensive warfare will continue to be characterized by--(1) deception/surprise, (2) mass, (3) high operational tempo, and (4) overwhelming concentration.⁶⁶

Force reductions and other treaty restrictions will, however, lessen the likelihood of a large-scale frontal assault against NATO. Instead, smaller, more modern forces moving at greater speeds will typify future Soviet offensive operations. The question then becomes: What will be the operational significance of an arms control agreement resulting in force parity? Before addressing the operational impacts of parity, however, it is important to examine the basic CFE environment.

The CFE talks are profoundly political transactions conducted in military currency. Recent events have ushered in a new and fertile climate which nourishes the opportunity to implement an arms reduction treaty. Budget restraints, burden-sharing, and public interest have combined as a powerful force which appears to be "shoving" the political process toward radical shifts in national security policy.

The official political negotiations began during November, 1986, in Vienna. The purpose was to establish broad parameters within which NATO and the WP could limit conventional arms in Europe. Agreed upon goals for CFE included: (1) promotion of stability in Europe, (2) removal of the possibility for surprise attack or large-scale offensive action, (3) lowering of the level of confrontation, and (4) elimination of asymmetries.⁶⁷

The initial step in attaining the CFE goals has been to negotiate the reduction of equipment deemed essential for successful lightening offensive operations by either side.⁶⁸ The five equipment categories being considered in the first CFE phase are tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, combat helicopters, and aircraft. Preliminary estimates indicate that WP forces may be reduced by 60 percent of the current levels while NATO lowers by just five percent.⁶⁹ Subsequent agendas will expand the types and number of conventional weapons considered for reduction. The elimination of equipment associated with offensive capabilities will continue to be an important facet of ongoing negotiations.

As would be expected, the arms reduction process is generating substantial political leverage. In the US, for example, President Bush has promised to reduce the US share of the NATO defense budget with savings from arms control agreements. Likewise, recent congressional hearings in Washington have used the prospects for reductions to relook the defense responsibilities of all NATO members.

Within each NATO country, similar political dynamics are at work to reduce the military force structure. The Alliance was supportive of the December, 1989, Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta which recommended even greater reductions than previously contemplated. However, most NATO allies oppose rapid cuts that could hobble the West's long-term forward defense strategy.⁷⁰

The pace and magnitude of the politically dominated CFE negotiations have the potential to disrupt and destabilize military operations.⁷¹ Most governmental decisions will affect national security policy which acts as a catalyst for changes in military strategy and operations. Former Chairman of the JCS, Admiral William Crowe, remains concerned over the fast-pace negotiations that may prove politically astute, but militarily jinxed.⁷²

VI. PARITY AND CHOICE

Western European security interests rest on the solid base of the NATO Alliance. As an organization, NATO has historically demonstrated the capacity to accommodate change and foster a relatively high degree of unity among its staunchly independent members. Such inherently difficult tasks have, over the years, been complicated by the antics of the Soviet Union. From the post-World War II hegemony in Eastern Europe, the Soviets have steadily developed into one of the globe's dominant military power.⁷³

In the 1990's, the NATO Alliance will be faced with a new and mysterious situation. Many NATO member nations believe the Soviets no longer represent a threat to attack Central Europe. This position reflects the judgements formed from the study of historical assessments and current projections. Moscow has seldom resorted to direct aggression. Their political preference has routinely been the subtle, indirect approach avoiding the use of Soviet forces.⁷⁴

Today, the traditional nemesis appears to be withdrawing into a sea of economic erosion inflamed by an anti-communist backwash. Internal and external pressures are pulling and tugging at the Soviet Union. The once unlikely opportunity to achieve conventional force parity between NATO and the WP now appears possible. Many positive indicators have signalled significant changes in Soviet policy. Secretary General Gorbachev's "new thinking" has had a positive and cascading influence on political reforms throughout the whole of Europe.

Decisions at the Kremlin have been significant to the European political community in general and to NATO in particular. The abrupt end of the Cold War represents a perceived opportunity for national governments throughout Europe to remedy growing politically sensitive problems. Budget deficits can conceivably be offset by reduced military expenditures. Social programs can be expanded. Demographic deficiencies in manning military units can be eased. In short, non-defense activities will stringently compete with defense programs for their slice of the so-called the "peace dividend."

The competition for resources between civil and military programs will be played in the chambers of the North Atlantic Council, the highest authority in NATO.⁷⁵ This forum, charged with maintaining international peace and security within NATO's Central Region, must ensure that political and military interests are aligned when engaged in arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

The upcoming CFE treaty will represent the "trump card" that, if played right, can improve European security with substantial cuts in overall defense spending. If played wrong, however, security may be jeopardized with horrific economic and social consequences. Uncertainty appears the only certain future for Central Europe.

A review of classical military theory may be useful to illuminate the pathway through such vague times. Clausewitz was no doubt correct in idealizing the political necessity of aligning means with ends. Even more astute, however, was his recognition of how conditions may prompt a government to become dominant, even decisive, during periods of reduced military tension.⁷⁶

The current Central European political impetus has attained such dominance through the Vienna negotiations process. The political "lethality" through arms control limitations is proving relatively more powerful than military hardware. Already the political salvos have registered devastating diplomatic blows on the two superpower arsenals. Recent action to negotiate away 29,000 WP tanks in exchange for only 2,000 NATO tanks exemplifies a kind of attrition warfare at its finest.⁷⁷

Though politically successful, military officials face the renewed challenge to reexamine how change will affect military operations. For instance, General von Sandrart (German Army), Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, believes that "increased limits will be imposed on future military operations by the civilian leadership."⁷⁸

Two long-standing NATO policies are illustrative of how the political process limits military alternatives. One constrains conventional ground defense forces to a forward defense. The other restricts ground force offensive maneuver from crossing the international border.⁷⁹ The policies are undoubtedly appropriate politically, but each serves to reduce military options.

The CFE treaty agreements between NATO and the WP will further harness adversarial warfighting capabilities. Mandated force structure and positioning requirements will expand the limits that serve to contain military operations. Take, for example, the initial negotiations which call for a 15 percent reduction in personnel and equipment by each side.

The number and type of weapons will be further restricted by geographical zones within an area from the USSR's Ural mountains to the Atlantic coast. At present, no one country may have more than 30 percent of the total number of tanks, artillery pieces, and armored troop carriers.⁸⁰ These politically imposed sanctions act as control measures to disperse equipment, thereby lessening overt military provocation and the capacity to concentrate for offensive operations. Other limits will likely include extensive military verification procedures, buffer zones, and movement control restrictions.

While force reductions and limitations are relatively straight forward, political and military risk assessment within NATO is rather fickle. Rapid changes in political condi-

tions are creating havoc with the strategic assessment process. For example, Senator John Glenn of the US Senate Armed Services Committee was recently dismayed over proceedings to consider cuts in defense spending by \$180 billion from the projected 1992-1994 budgets. The proposal was presented by the Secretary of Defense with "no reference to strategy and no reference whatsoever to what the threat is . . . if we don't have that, cutting the defense budget will be a free-for-all."⁸¹ Similar dynamics in Europe have caused even greater problems for other NATO governments.

Today, the Western Alliance is being forced to operate precariously in designing a defense which features reduced means and vague end states. Both conditions serve to increase risks, further complicate defense planning, and raise the probability that the defensive operations will be dangerously reactive in nature.

To help avoid an overly reactive military strategy, NATO must develop future defense concepts that are politically plausible in peace and militarily viable as a deterrent and as a warfighting posture. The ultimate test of any military strategy is not, however, whether it succeeds in maintaining peace, but whether in the event of war, peace can be restored on politically favorable terms and at an acceptable cost.⁸²


Despite all the rhetoric and strategic thinking, the one dominant military reality confronting NATO over the years has been the WP's overwhelming correlation of forces. The highly favorable force ratios of the pre-CFE period created operational conditions for the success of a Soviet-style blitzkrieg.

The conservative 3:1 WP combat power advantage over NATO has historically destabilized Europe and the overall peace process. The sizeable Soviet conventional advantage allowed them a wide-array of strategic attack options relative to a militarily weaker NATO. The WP's offensive persuasion, their quantitative superiority, and rapid qualitative improvements forced NATO to continually adjust its defense methodology to enhance conditions serving deterrence.

One important adjustment was NATO's evolution toward a more maneuver-oriented defense. Figure 1 is a pre-CFE graphic portrayal of the relationship between combat power ratios and the tendency to adopt a particular style of attrition or maneuver warfare.

The Soviet's emphasis on offensive doctrine and a favorable combat power advantage supported their inclination toward maneuver warfare. In contrast, NATO has generally lacked the conventional options necessary to counter the awesome Soviet power. The Alliance would likely lose a war of

attrition against the Pact. Similarly, the likelihood of NATO defeating the WP in a war of maneuver was also viewed with pessimism. The allies are not equipped, organized, trained, or prepared for a



strategic offensive in Central Europe.⁸³ The NATO remedy was thus to become more reliant on maneuver warfare as one of the few options with a chance to win against a quantitatively superior force.

The 1987 Operational Guide for Land Forces in Central Europe provides doctrinal evidence of NATO's growing emphasis on maneuver warfare.⁸⁴ The guide encourages the use of mobile operations to strike decisive objectives as close to the border as possible. This pre-CFE document cautions against the use of major formations positioned in a linear, attrition-oriented defense--a type defense viewed as quickly lost given NATO's numerical inferiority.⁸⁵


Similarly, it has been long argued that NATO's chance of thwarting a large-scale WP attack with an attrition-based, forward defense would be negligible. The standard argument suggest the Soviets can mass at points of their choosing along NATO's extended front, achieve overwhelming force ratios, and affect deep strategic penetrations. The paucity of NATO's reserve forces was not perceived as having the ability to stop the Soviets armored spearheads. Increasingly, the Alliance has had to emphasize maneuver as a virtual last resort to counter the Soviet's numerical advantage.⁸⁶

Unfortunately, NATO's flirtation with maneuver warfare has come late and sporadically, much like the eleventh-hour French actions before falling prey to the Germans in 1940.

Figure 2 moves ahead to the post-CFE period when NATO and WP conventional forces are at, or near, strategic parity.

The previous Soviet advantages in maneuver and firepower will dissipate within the CFE regulated ATTU region. The conditions may then suggest that NATO's future defense concept would benefit by restoring the value inherent in attrition warfare (e.g. advanced weapons, fortifications, and barriers). Such a defensive scheme promotes deterrence by signaling the WP that aggression into the West will result in high cost and little payoff.⁸⁷

Fighting battles of attrition in a post-CFE environment do not fit into Soviet plans. For the Soviet Union, both historical precedent and current economic woes, posit the necessity for a quick military victory--a condition not generally possible in wars of attrition. The likes of Marx, Engels, Lenin and others have hammered into the Soviet consciousness that "victory in war generally accrues to him who has the greater economic potential."⁸⁸



Today, the Soviets are economically retarded. They simply cannot afford to resource a protracted war. Such warfare demands economic staying power. "Illustrative of the Soviet's plight is their meager 12% of the world's GNP which is far behind the US, Western Europe, the Japanese, and are subject to being overtaken by China within the next 30 years if growth patterns remain constant."⁸⁹

The WP's decadent economic condition is perhaps the center of gravity of their faltering alliance. Internal economic pressure has proven to be a dominant force behind the Soviet decision to unilaterally withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe. Likewise, the Soviet decisions have served in part to expedite the CFE treaty reductions process. The West has suddenly become the beneficiary of more liberalized defense options previously paralyzed by the Soviet strength across the entire NATO front.

A recent study by the Vector Corporation lends support to the preceding contention that parity will be in the best interest of the NATO Alliance. The study concluded that a post-CFE NATO can defeat a Soviet attack across the IGB as long as NATO remains equal with Soviet force modernization efforts.⁹⁰ Though this assessment has value, it was not intended to substitute for the grueling task of relooking NATO's future defense requirements caused by the large and rapid changes in Alliance policy and resource constraints.

As NATO's post-CFE defense is contemplated, it is appropriate to anticipate the role that attrition and maneuver warfare will play in meeting future security requirements. Without doubt, both attrition and maneuver warfare will continue to be important in the conduct of the forward defense where 16 member nations have vowed to never give ground to an invading force.⁹¹

Advocates of the attrition theory often see technology as the solution for NATO's future defense. Once "radical" sounding ideas which were viewed as technologically unrealistic and militarily naive are now being revisited. Known collectively as "defensive or alternative defenses," these concepts are basically devoid of offensive capabilities. They include rapidly deployable antitank barriers, extensive early-warning sensor networks, highly mobile units with antitank weapons rather than tanks, and "smart" weapons to strike enemy armored vehicles tens or even hundreds of miles away.⁹²

Technology definitely has its advantages, but it also has its critics. Some accuse the Western nations of having a "magic weapon mentality." They defend their position by referring to the infamous French experience of trying to use technology as the panacea for defending against the Germans in 1940. The consequences were disastrous. The famed barrier defense network, the Maginot Line, failed to prevent the German invasion; instead it encouraged complacency and virtually broke the national treasury. Some contend the line actually

made war more likely. Others, however, fault the French lack of leadership, not the Line, for the collapse of the defense.⁹³

Regardless of the one's position on technology, the lethality of modern weapons can not be ignored. Few would have guessed that the clash of Israeli and Arab massed armored formations in 1973 would destroy 50 per cent of all combat materials and equipment within two weeks.⁹⁴

The post-CFE period will have a role for a highly lethal, attrition-oriented defense of NATO's critical regions. One primary justification will include slowing a potential Soviet assault. This need will allow NATO to gain time for the mobilization, deployment, and reinforcement of its full combat capabilities. Inherent in buying time through attrition warfare is the need to safeguard against a delayed political decision which authorizes the use of military force--an understandable political fear of escalating a crisis prematurely.⁹⁵

A second reason which favors attrition of an attacker would be to increase forces available for use with the operational reserve. Naturally, the reduction of forces to parity will adversely affect the frontline force-to-space ratio--the optimum number of soldiers needed to defend a specified territory. Such a reduction normally heightens the reliance on reserve forces capable of responding to trouble spots or exploiting enemy vulnerabilities.⁹⁶ Some analysts estimate

the cumulative effects of various fortifications in the NATO Central Region to be two divisions' worth of force savings.⁹⁷

The obstacle-ridden terrain of the Central Region will also play a pivotal role in the development of operational concepts. The defensible terrain along the IGB is a marked advantage for the NATO Alliance. A WP attack against a technologically sophisticated defender on Germany's rugged terrain would have been a formidable task before CFE and will be even more difficult after the treaty is implemented.

The Soviets have likewise realized the difficulty in achieving a deep strategic penetration into NATO territory.⁹⁸ The deadly combination of terrain and advanced weaponry have caused them to edge ever closer to a defensive strategy.⁹⁹ Other factors such as CFE limitations, as well as NATO's long-range operational fires and improvements in early warning, have complicated thoughts of Soviet aggression to the West. In short, parity between NATO and the WP will enhance the former's ability to fight effective attrition warfare if warranted. The WP, on the other hand, must avoid a prolonged war of attrition that her economy can not sustain.¹⁰⁰ Deterrence is served.

Supporters of maneuver warfare ardently acclaim its many virtues. An excellent paper by the Commandant of the British Staff College, Major General J.J.G. Mackenzie, addresses both attrition and maneuver warfare in Central Europe. He accents

the vital nature of using an operational counter offensive force to exploit tactical success. His conclusion proclaims that "the case for the adoption of maneuver theory as the basic concept of operations in the Central Region seems overpowering."¹⁰¹

Major General Pollard, Director of British Army Training and Doctrine (Army), is another outspoken advocate of maneuver warfare. He sees virtually no contradiction in saying that within NATO's strategic defense posture there should be deterrent capability at the strategic level and an offensive capability at the operational and tactical level. He does, however, see a need to caution his government to stop the current erosion of its operational offensive elements.¹⁰² This warning applies equally to the other NATO members desirous of maneuver, yet bridled by the reins of political dictate--a reason to exhort the virtues inherent in an attrition-oriented defense.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Those who rejoice at the present-day difficulties of the Soviet Union and who look forward to the collapse of that empire might wish to recall that such transformations normally occur at very great cost, and not always in a predictable fashion.¹⁰³

The momentous task of executing a CFE agreement between sixteen NATO and seven WP countries has been labeled "the most complex diplomatic task in history."¹⁰⁴ The stakes are high, but the optimum end result can yield a more assured convention-

al deterrence at lowered defense costs. An opposite result could be conflict--perhaps even war across the nuclear threshold.

The future challenge will be to keep military muscle behind the CFE treaty's political clout. A closely aligned diplomatic and military front will enhance deterrence as military activities in Central Europe becomes increasingly transparent and predictable. More importantly, CFE-generated symmetries will allow NATO to strengthen its forward defense by placing increased emphasis on attrition warfare while retaining the ability to maneuver--perhaps using multinational forces.

Parity has rekindled the opportunity to use more of the spectrum between a static, positional defense and one that is dominated by maneuver. The vitality of maneuver is not sacrificed, only enhanced, by a more resolute defense from which to launch offensive operations. The NATO Alliance will benefit from renewed operational options designed to prolong a future war with the WP--a condition the Soviets desperately want to avoid.

Before CFE, the WP had a surplus of advantages over the NATO defense. The Soviet military held the initiative. Their plans dictated the time and place of the attack, the conditions for battle, and the flexibility to exploit success. Furthermore, their force structure was sufficient to achieve the desired operational tempo across a large front.

The die seemed cast for the larger WP forces to defeat NATO. The Alliance's response to surmount the large quantitative deficit was to evolve toward an increasingly reactive, high-risk mobile defense which gave ground to protect the main battle area. To overcome the lack of depth, NATO began to emphasize operational fires designed to extend the battlefield, and to disrupt the tempo of follow-on enemy echelons.

When the initial CFE treaty is implemented, the general equality and physical separation of NATO and WP forces in the ATTU area will become evident. The benefactor will be NATO. Deterrence will theoretically improve with neither side having an immediate advantage to exploit. If a conventional war did erupt, attrition-oriented systems would lengthen the time available for either diplomatic maneuvering or military action to end the hostilities.

The use of low-cost, non-obtrusive barrier systems should be NATO's first installment on a long-range plan to revitalize attrition warfare in Central Europe. A system of fixed obstacles, high-technology dynamic mine fields and sensor networks, underground pipelines filled with liquid explosives, and terrain reinforcement (e.g. forestation, recreational lakes) exemplify affordable, verifiable methods to strengthen critical areas. Such measures improve conventional deterrence and accrue strength over time, especially as emerging technology weapons are integrated into the defense.

The move to renew the emphasis on attrition warfare brings forth several distinct advantages to a post-CFE defense. The first is to conserve resources within the forward defensive area. A small number of active cadre could plan and train territorial and reserve forces to operate in the forward obstacle zone. This economy of force measure appears consistent with force reductions that erode force-to-space ratios.

Another advantage features an opportunity to establish killing zones where operational fires are brought to bear against enemy high-value targets. Increasingly important is the need to ensure that the operational commander possesses the ability to attack troop concentrations, for example, in the 150 to 300 kilometer range with ground, air, and sea-based systems. Rapid action to destroy the density and tempo of the attacking force will be an essential element of maneuvering fires to achieve operational effects.

Though operational fires will remain critical in a parity situation, the procedures for their use will be complicated due to changing relations within the WP. Intricate preconditions will need to be established to warrant deep fires against Soviet forces transiting or staging in Eastern Europe--a most unlikely occurrence in today's political arena. In fact, there is growing opinion that the Soviets would have to fight their way through to West Germany.¹⁰⁵

A third aspect of a parity defense lies in the disposition and use of operational reserves to counter penetrations of the forward defense. The defeat of the French in 1940 was primari-

ly the result of their poor intelligence, the malpositioning of forces, and a purely defensive mindset. Neither operational fires nor maneuver were used to interject innovative, decisive action into the largely static defense. This study does not advocate a return to a Maginot Line mentality. Instead, there is a serious need for a more balanced use of attrition and maneuver once parity has been achieved between NATO and the WP. The two forms of warfare must work in tandem with smaller, lighter, more powerful reserves maneuvering around fortified defensive positions to strike indirect blows into the enemy flanks.

Future European security will hinge on using attrition warfare to enhance maneuver in disrupting the Soviet's operational tempo. It is this ability to dictate the tempo of battle that is the real meaning of initiative. Decisive offensive action framed by rigorous defensive efforts will provide the defender an opportunity to turn Soviet mass into a liability to be exploited.¹⁰⁶

In short, the negotiated parity agreement should cause NATO's military leadership to refocus on actions that deny the WP a quick victory. A cost-effective program to physically strengthen NATO's critical defensive areas is increasingly essential in meeting today's changing conditions.

While military considerations may not be sufficient to convince European governments of the merits of barrier defenses, the realities of budget constraints, the need for force economies, and demographic development may make NATO more receptive. The changing East-West relations and recent movement in conventional arms control also may direct more interest to the defensive and stabilizing nature of barriers.¹⁰⁷

ENDNOTES

¹Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," International Security, (Fall, 1988), pp. 123-124.

²Ibid., p. 129.

³Ibid., p. 129.

⁴Associated Press, "A Year of Incredible Changes," Kansas City Star, (November 12, 1989), p. 22A.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Stephen M. Meyer, pp. 145-146.

⁸"The Russians Aren't Coming," U.S. News and World Report, (November 27, 1989), p. 53.

⁹John Akehurst, "NATO and Europe: Practical Issues and Military Interests," RUSI Journal, (Spring, 1989), p. 10.

¹⁰"Dismantling the Cold War," Jane's Defence Weekly, (13 January 1990), p. 72.

¹¹Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 8-9.

¹²U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (May, 1986), p. 9.

¹³Steven Miller, Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 63.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁵FM 100-5, p. 10.

¹⁶Michael I. Handel (ed), Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1986), p. 59.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁸Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 69.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 87-88.

²⁰Ibid., p. 76.

²¹Handel, pp. 81-82.

²²Ibid., p. 56.

²³Ibid., p. 357-358.

²⁴William Park, Defending the West (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.

²⁵Ibid., p. 5-6.

²⁶Ibid., p. 20.

²⁷NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures, (Brussels, 1984), p. 264.

- ²⁸Ibid., p. 264.
- ²⁹Park, p. 15-17.
- ³⁰George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, (Boston, 1967), p. 359.
- ³¹Daniel J. Kaufman, et al., U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1985), pp. 439-448.
- ³²Park, p. 88.
- ³³Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1985: The Situation and Development of the Federal Armed Forces, p. 29.
- ³⁴Park, p. 176-177.
- ³⁵Ibid.
- ³⁶Ibid.
- ³⁷Ibid.
- ³⁸Ibid., p. 188-189.
- ³⁹Sam Nunn, "Challenges to NATO in the 1990's," Vital Speeches of the Day (December 15, 1989), pp. 135-140.
- ⁴⁰Ibid, p. 137.
- ⁴¹Ibid, p. 138.
- ⁴²Richard Natkiel, Atlas of World War II (New York: The Military Press, 1985), p. 20.

⁴³Connell, p. 15.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 13.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁷Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing Co., 1974), p. 348.

⁴⁸Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 85.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 86.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 87.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 100.

⁵²Wright, p. 392.

⁵³Horne, p. 101.

⁵⁴Wright, p. 392.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 394.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 395.

⁵⁷P. H. Vigor, Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 3.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 3.

⁵⁹Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change, 1989, (Washington, DC, 1989), p. 22.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 5.

⁶¹Ibid., p.7.

⁶²"NATO's Problem is Its Tremendous Success," International Defense Review, October, 1989, pp. 1319-1320.

⁶³Thomas J. Marshall, "New Openings for Conventional Arms Control," Parameters, June 1989, pp. 84-85.

⁶⁴Stephen M. Meyer, pp. 145-146.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 150.

⁶⁶J J G Mackenzie, The Counter Offensive: MOD/King's College London Seminar, Conference on Britain and the Central Region (18-19 July 1989), p. 5.

⁶⁷"CFE: The Starting Lines," Arms Control Today (April, 1989), p. 7.

⁶⁸"Dismantling the Cold War, p. 72.

⁶⁹Ibid. p. 79.

⁷⁰"Does America Need an Army?" U.S. News and World Report, (December 11, 1989) p. 24.

⁷¹"Dismantling the Cold War," p. 75.

⁷²"The Russians Aren't Coming," U.S. News and World Report, (November 27, 1989), p. 53.

⁷³Park, pp. 21-26.

⁷⁴Miller, p. 75.

⁷⁵NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures, 10th ed., rev, (Brussels, 1984), p. 89.

⁷⁶Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p. 81.

⁷⁷Gordon Sullivan Lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, 3 August 1989.

⁷⁸Hans-Henning Von Sandrart, "Operational Art in a Technological Age - A Central Region Perspective," NATO's Sixteen Nations (July/August 1989), p. 26.

⁷⁹William H. Janes, Col., "Operational Art in NATO: How Will Politically Motivated Restrictions Affect Operational Maneuver?" AOSF Monograph, January, 1988, p. 20.

⁸⁰Vienna Negotiations: CFE and CSBM, (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, June 1989), p. 29.

⁸¹William Matthews, "For the Military: A Growing Sense of Anxiety," Army Times, (January 1, 1990), p. 8.

⁸²Steven E. Miller, p.64.

⁸³White Paper, p. 79.

⁸⁴Hans Henning Von Sandrart, (Gen.), Operational Guideline, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, FRG, August 1987. .

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁶John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 48-51.

⁸⁷Stephen J. Flanagan, NATO's Conventional Defenses, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 99-106.

⁸⁸P.H. Vigor, p. 92.

⁸⁹Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 513.

⁹⁰Vector Corporation Study, Asymmetrical Force Reduction (Secret), (Vector Research Inc., 1989), pp. 1-62.

⁹¹The Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper, 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces, (Druckhaus Dierichs GmbH, 1985), pp. 76-80.

⁹²"The Russians Aren't Coming," p. 49.

⁹³Jon Connell, The New Maginot Line. (New York: Arbor House), 1986, Forward.

⁹⁴John L. Romjue, "From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982." TRADOC Historical Monograph, June 1984, p. 6.

⁹⁵Wolfgang Schlör, "Barrier Defense in Europe: An Option for the 1990s," Parameters, (March, 1990), pp. 21-22.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 21.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 22.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 184.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 185.

¹⁰⁰John Mearsheimer, p. 48-51.

¹⁰¹J.J.G. Mackenzie, p. 30.

¹⁰²A.J.G. Pollard, Future Defence of the Central Region, Monograph (London: King's College, 1989), p. 17.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," International Security, (Fall, 1988), pp. 123-124.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 129.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 129.

¹⁰⁷Wolfgang Schlör, p. 34.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Periodicals

- Akehurst, John. "NATO and Europe: Practical Issues and Military Interests, " RUSI Journal, (Spring, 1989), p. 10.
- "Asymmetrical Force Reductions" (Classified). (Ann Arbor, MI: Vector Research, Inc.), October 5, 1989.
- Associated Press, "A Year of Incredible Changes," Kansas City Star (November 12, 1989), p. 22A.
- Barry, John and Evan Thomas. "Getting Ready for the Future." Newsweek, January 22, 1990, p. 25.
- Budiansky, Stephen and Assoc. "The Russians Aren't Coming." U.S. News and World Report (November 22, 1989), p. 47-54.
- "CFE: The Starting Lines," Arms Control Today (April, 1989), p. 9.
- Connell, Jon. The New Maginot Line. New York: Arbor House, 1986.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. NATO's Central Region Forces. London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1986.
- Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988.
- "Dismantling the Cold War," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 13, 1990, p. 72-75.
- "Does America Need An Army?" U.S. News and World Report, (December 11, 1989), p. 24.
- Donnelly, Tom. "War of the Future: Fast Paced, Highly Lethal" Army Times, January, 1989.
- Flanagan, Stephen J. NATO's Conventional Defenses. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988.
- Galvin, John. "NATO's Enduring Mission." NATO's Sixteen Nations (October, 1989).
- Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu: The Art of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Handel, Michael I. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. New Jersey: Robert Hartnoll Ltd., 1986.

- Horne, Alistair. To Lose A Battle: France 1940. New York: Penguin Books, 1969.
- Howard, Michael and Peter Paret. On War. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Janes, William Col. "Operational Art in NATO: How will Politically Motivated Restrictions Affect Operational Maneuver?" SAMS Monograph, January 10, 1988.
- Karber, Phillip A. "In Defense of Forward Defense." Armed Forces Journal International, 1984.
- Kaufman, Daniel J. et al. U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1985), pp. 439-448.
- Kennan, George F. Memoirs 1925-1950. Boston: Boston University Press, 1967.
- Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.
- Knight, Robin. "Does NATO Have Middle-Age Myopia?" U.S. News and World Report (June 5, 1989)
- Mackenzie, J.J.G. (Maj. Gen.) "The Counter Offensive," King's College London Seminar Monograph, (July, 1989), p. 4.
- Mako, William P. U.S. Forces and the Defense of Central Europe. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1983.
- Marshall, Thomas J. "New Openings for Conventional Arms Control," Parameters, (June, 1989), pp. 85-85.
- Matthews, William. "For the Military: A Growing Sense of Anxiety," Army Times, (January 1, 1990), p. 8.
- Mearsheimer, John J. Conventional Deterrence. New York: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Meyer, Stephen M. "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," International Security, (Fall, 1988), pp. 145-146.
- Miller, Steven. Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Milton, T.R. Gen. USAF (Ret). "What Follows the Reductions?" Air Force Magazine, August, 1989, p. 92.
- Natkiel, Richard. Atlas of World War II. New York: The Military Press, 1985.
- "NATO's Problem is Its Tremendous Success." International Defense Review (October, 1989), p. 1319-1320.

- Naumann, Klaus. "The Restructured Bundeswehr." NATO's Sixteen Nations (October, 1989), p. 31-35.
- Nunn, Sam. "Challenges to NATO in the 1990's," Vital Speeches of the Day (December 15, 1989). pp. 135-140.
- Otis, Glenn K. Gen. (Ret.). "Future Concepts and Capabilities in NATO's Central Region." Royal United Services Institute Journal (Winter, 1988), p. 17-19.
- Park, William. Defending the West. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.
- Pollard, A.J.G. (Maj. Gen.) "Future Defence of the Central Region." Conference on Britain and the Central Region, British Army Staff College and King's College of London, July 1989.
- Romjue, John L. "From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982." TRADOC Historical Monograph, June 1984, p. 6.
- Schlor, Wolfgang. "Barrier Defense in Europe: An Option for the 1990's." Parameters, March 1990.
- Sokolovsky, Marshal. Voennaya Strategiya. (Voenizdat, 1986), p. 10.
- Sullivan, Gordon. Lecture to School of Advanced Military Studies, 3 August, 1989.
- U.S. Government Printing Office. Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change, 1989. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
- Vienna Negotiations: CFE and CSBM. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
- Vigor, P.H. Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- Von Sandrart, Hans Henning Gen. "Considerations of the Battle in Depth." Military Review (October, 1987).
- Von Sandrart, Hans Henning (Gen.) Operational Guideline, (Operational Guideline for the Command and Control of Land Forces in Central Europe.) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, FRG August 1987.
- Wright, Gordon. France in Modern Times. Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing Co., 1974.

MANUALS

Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1986.

NATO Information Service. NATO Facts and Figures. Brussels, 1984, p. 264.

West German Federal Minister of Defence. White Paper 1985: The Situation and Development of the Federal Armed Forces, p. 29.

West German Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1983., p. 142-145.